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ANTITRUST-TYING ARRANGEMENTS-Conditioning
Grant of Credit upon Purchase of Seller's Product Held
to be Tying Arrangement and within Per Se Ban of Sec. 1
of the Sherman Act.
Petitioner, Fortner Enterprises, Inc., received a loan of $2,000,000
from a subsidiary of United States Steel Corporation, the United States
Steel Homes Credit Corporation, for the purchase and development of
certain parcels of land in Louisville, Kentucky. The loan was granted
on the condition that Fortner erect upon each of the parcels a prefabri-
cated house manufactured by United States Steel. Of the $2,000,000,
$1,700,000 was for the purchase of the prefabricated homes.
Petitioner alleged that the price of each home was $400 above the price
of comparable models manufactured by competitors of United States
Steel. Petitioner explained further that he only accepted the tying con-
dition on the loan because the offer of 100% financing was uniquely
advantageous to him as similar terms were not available from other
financial institutions in the Louisville area. The plaintiff filed suit
alleging that the prefabricated materials were defective and unusable
and sought treble damages and an injunction under Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act.'
The District Court entered summary judgment for the defendant2
and held that although this was a tying arrangement of the traditional
kind, the petitioner had failed to establish the two prerequisites of
illegality under the tying cases. First, the Court stated that United
States Steel's contract with the petitioner foreclosed only an insignificant
amount of commerce in prefabricated housing. Secondly, the Court
held that United States Steel didn't have the requisite economic power
over credit, the tying product, because although petitioner established
that the loans were uniquely attractive to him, he did not prove that
the Credit Corporation enjoyed the same unique attractiveness with
respect to buyers generally. The Court of Appeals affirmed.3
The Supreme Court reversed4 stating that the District Court had mis-
interpreted the two prerequisites of illegality under the tying cases.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1965).
2. Fortner Enterprises Incorporated v. United States Steel Corporation, 293 F.
Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
3. Fortner Enterprises Incorporated v. United States Steel Corporation, 404 F.2d
936 (6th Cir. 1968).
4. Fortner Enterprises Incorporated v. United States Steel Corporation, 394 U.S.
495 (1969).
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The Court held that these standards are not necessary for petitioner to
prevail on the merits, but are applicable only if he wishes to invoke the
doctrine of per se illegality. Moreover, the Court went further and held
that for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment the two
prerequisites were indeed fulfilled. The Court stated that in view of
the fact that no other financial institution would risk offering 100%
financing and that petitioner would be willing to pay $400 more per
home than if he bought homes from United State's Steel's competitors, it
could be construed that respondent's uniquely attractive terms reflected
economic power. Also, viewing the sales policy of the respondent,
rather than merely the specific contract with petitioner, the tying ar-
rangement foreclosed a substantial amount of commerce in the tied
product-prefabricated housing.
The decision in Fortner clarifies the ambiguity surrounding the Su-.
preme Court's application of the per se rule of illegality concerning tying
arrangements. The two criteria previously required for per se illegality
in tying cases: market power over the tying product, and foreclosure of
a substantial volume of commerce in the tied product are defined in such
a manner that the latter criterion is measured in dollar volume rather
than in terms of a percentage of the relevant market, and the former
criterion is no longer measured by "market dominance" when the tying
product is a non-patented and non-copyrighted product. Indeed, the
Court uses a "uniqueness" test, i.e. if the tying product is uniquely de-
sirable or attractive to buyers, even though the tying product is a fun-
gible item such as credit, the requisite market power is established.
Although this decision seems to represent an extension of the "per se
rule" from that enunciated by earlier Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning tying arrangements, the Court has not held all tying arrange-
ments, in and of themselves, to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.
Moreover, the holding of the Court makes it clear that a tying arrange-
ment which does not meet these criteria may still be held to violate the
Sherman Act by application of the "Rule of Reason".
Fortner seems particularly significant not only because of its modifica-
tion of the technical requirements of the per se doctrine in tying cases,
but also because of the severe economic repercussions which may result
from the opinion. The Court's decision raises serious questions as to
the validity of conditioning a loan, in any form, upon purchase of a
separate product of the lender, particularly where the lending agency is a
separate corporate subsidiary of the corporation producing the other
product.
133.
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THE NATURE OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS
A tying arrangement exists whenever one party agrees to sell a
product (the tying product) only if the buyer also purchases a second
distinct product (the tied product) or refrains from purchasing that
product from any other seller.5 An obvious consequence of such an
arrangement is that the buyer receives two products after making one
choice, whereas without a tying arrangement, the buyer would have two
independent choices available to him. Theoretically, in the absence of
a tying agreement, the decision to purchase each product is made inde-
pendently and the buyer separately weighs the merits of each product.
A tying arrangement, however, coerces the buyer and restricts his
judgment, and to the extent that it is entered into, it forecloses competi-
tors of the seller from the market for the tied product. It also serves
as a means of extending the seller's power in the tying product into
power in the market for the tied product.6 In order to successfully
compel a buyer to purchase a product that he doesn't desire, the seller
must have substantial economic power in the market for the tying prod-
uct; but if the buyer has no great antipathy to purchasing the tied
product, less economic power in the market for the tying product is
required.7  Thus, to adversely affect competing suppliers of the tied
product, and to extend a minimum amount of power into the market
for the tied product, less than dominance or monopoly in the tying
product is required. This illustrates the fact that any rule on the illegal-
ity of tying agreements which requires that the seller have a dominant
position in the market for the tying product mainly protects prospective
buyers from coercion; it does not fully protect competing sellers of
the tied product from choices made by diffident sellers. The coercion
of buyers is only one facet of the larger problem of market foreclosure
in the tied product and the extension of power from one market to
another.
The Supreme Court in Times Picayune v. United States, stated its
reasons for viewing tie-ins with disfavor.8 Since any superiority in
5. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Austin, The
Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 95,
where the author suggests that whenever a buyer must purchase one item in order
to be able to purchase a second item (regardless of the number of sellers, there
is a tying arrangement. This is in contrast to the traditional view which focuses upon
a solitary seller.
6. Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 626
(1965).
7. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under The Antitrust Laws, 72
HARV. L. REV. 50, 60 (1958).
8. 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1952).
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the tied product would cause it to be freely chosen over the other
products, only the prospect of reducing competition would cause the
seller to adopt such a contract, and only the seller's control over the
supply of the tying product could coerce a buyer into abdicating his
independent judgment.'
It is with that view as to the purposes of tying agreements that
Justice Black, writing for the majority in Northern Pacific Railroad
Company v. United States0 stated:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use .. .among the prac-
tices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in
and of themselves are price fixing, group boycotts, and tying
arrangements.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "PER SE" RULE
AGAINST TYING AGREEMENTS
The traditional statement of the per se rule against tying arrange-
ments was first enunciated by Justice Clark in Times-Picayune v.
United States:"
From the "tying" cases a perceptible pattern of illegality
emerges: when the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the
market for the "tying" product, or if a substantial volume of
commerce in the "tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement
violates the narrower standards expressed in section 3 of the
Clayton Act,12 because from either factor the requisite potential
lessening of competition is inferred. And because for even a lawful
monopolist it is "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from
any substantial market", a tying arrangement is banned by section
9. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19,
29 (1957), disputes this traditional view. He states that the use of a tie-in does not
necessarily mean that the seller is attempting to extend monopoly power from one
market to another--i.e. leverage. Mr. Bowman finds other goals in the formation
of a tie-in and he discusses five situations and only one involves leverage. Also, both
Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Ex-
clusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REV. 913, 951(1952) and Pearson, supra note 6, at 644 states that without substantial market power
over the tying product there are no anticompetitive effects.
10. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
11. 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953).
12. "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States ...or fix a price charged there-
fore, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or
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1 of the Sherman Act whenever both conditions are met. s
The decision of the Supreme Court in International Salt Co. v. United
States4 began the development of the present per se treatment of tying
arrangements. International Salt owned patents on machines for the
utilization of salt. The distribution of these machines was conducted
through leases which required that the lessees purchase all the unpat-
ented salt and salt tablets used in the machines from International Salt.
Justice Jackson writing for the Court stated:
Appellant contends, however, that summary judgment was un-
authorized because it precluded trial of alleged issues of fact as
to whether the restraint was unreasonable within the Sherman
Act or substantially lessened competition or tended to create a
monopoly in salt within the Clayton Act. We think the admitted
facts left no genuine issue. Not only is price-fixing unreasonable,
per se, but also it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors
from any substantial market. 15
The Court in International Salt v. United States did not deem it
necessary to examine the economic consequences of the lease arrange-
ment, nor did it inquire whether International Salt Co. occupied a
dominant position as a seller of salt utilization machines. What the
Court seemed to suggest was that a patent, with its characteristics of a
legal monopoly, was the equivalent of market dominance. The Court
found that its standard that "it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose
competitors from any substantial market", was met under the facts of
the instant case by finding that the volume of business affected by the
leases of the salt machines, $500,000 could not be called "insignificant"
or "insubstantial".16 Thus, when the Court is confronted by a tying
arrangement where the tying product is patented, the rule is virtually a
per se one. The only requirement that prevents an automatic con-
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or
competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract
for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1965).
13. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1965).
14. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
15. Id. at 396.
16. Id. See Austin, supra note 5, at 107. But see Turner, supra note 7, at 53,
where the author interprets the decision of the Court differently. He argues that the
Court presumed that there were other competing machines available, and, thus, the
Court would mean that "dominance" is presumed upon a showing that the tying
product had some unique aspect. The uniqueness of the tying product was supplied
by its patent, and this distinctiveness causes some buyers to prefer it over the competi-
tive machines.
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clusion of the illegality of such an arrangement is the necessity that the
volume of business foreclosed in the tied product is not insubstantial.
Times-Picayune v. United States'7 dealt with a non-patented tying
product, general display and classified advertising. Times-Picayune
Publishing Company owned both a morning and an evening newspaper.
Buyers of advertising space could not purchase space in only one of the
two papers, but were compelled to purchase space in both papers or none
at all. The Court held that a tying arrangement did not exist because
the products sold were identical and the market was the same.' How-
ever, the decision did not rest there; the Court went on to deal with
the concept of market power. The Court defined the requisite market
power as "dominance" in the market of the tying product, and held that
"dominance" was to be found by examining comparative market
data.19 There were three newspapers in the New Orleans and the Times-
Picayune controlled 40% of the newspaper advertising market. The
Court reasoned that since an equal share of the market should be 33
1/3 %, 40% could hardly be called "dominance".20
Northern Pacific Railroad Company v. United States2' presented an-
other tying arrangement case involving a non-patented product. North-
ern Pacific sold and leased several million acres of land, and in the con-
tracts included a preferential routing clause that required the grantees
and lessees to ship all the commodities produced on the land over
Northern Pacific lines as long as its rates were equal to those of com-
peting carriers. The Government moved for summary judgment and
its motion was granted.
Justice Black, writing for the Court, interpreted the con6ept of "dom-
inance" enunciated by the Court in Times-Picayune:
While there is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion
which speaks of "monopoly power" or "dominance" over the tying
product as a necessary precondition for application of the rule of
per se unreasonableness to tying arrangements, we do not con-
strue this general language as requiring anything more than suffi-
cient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free
competition in the tied product (assuming all the time, of course,
that a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is
affected).22
17. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
18. Id. at 614.
19. Id. at 611.
20. Id. at 613.
21. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
22. Id. at 11.
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Although in its interpretation of the concept of "dominance" the
Court focused on the power to restrain competition in the tied prod-
uct, it did not examine what effect, if any, the agreements had pro-
duced in the transportation market. Rather, it found that the extensive
landholdings of the Railroad were particularly desirable to purchasers,
basing this finding on their excellent location and attributes, and on
the fact that there were a "host" of these tying arrangements. The
Court further stated that the mere presence of such a large number of
tying agreements, lacking any adequate contrary explanation, was suffi-
cient to indicate the presence of the requisite power in the tying prod-
uct. 23 Thus, unlike Times-Picayune, the Court did not determine the
Railroad's market power by reference to comparative market data, but
looked only to Northern Pacific's landholdings.
Northern Pacific should not be interpreted to indicate an abandon-
ment of the concept of market power, Indeed, the opinion declares that:
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over
the tying product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon
to pressure buyers into taking the tied item, any restraint of trade
attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be insig-
nificant at most.24
What was abandoned by the holding in Northern Pacific v. United
States was the concept of an independent measure of market power.
Since, as was stated in Standard Oil Company v. United States,2 5 only
the control of the tying device could induce a buyer to enter into a
tying agreement,28 the Court in Northern Pacific reasoned that the
existence of a number of tying agreements, in the absence of any
other adequate explanation, can only be the result of economic power
in the market for the tying product. Viewed from this angle, the
requisite power becomes only that which is necessary to persuade a
substantial number of buyers to suffer the burdensome terms of a tie-
in and to choose the seller's product over other non-tied products. This
power could be equivalent to market dominance or it could be equiva-
lent to a desirably located parcel of land.
The question of what constitutes the requisite market power was faced
again in United States v. Lowe's Incorporated.27  Loew's Inc. dis-
tributed its films to television stations through block booking. A buyer
23. Id. at 8. See Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity, 29 Omo ST.
L.J. 539, 544 (1968).
24. 356 U.S. at 6.
25. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
26. Id. at 306.
27. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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was forced to purchase films of inferior quality if he also desired to
purchase films of classic stature. The Supreme Court held the tying
arrangements were illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
As to the standard of market power the Court stated:
The standard of illegality is that the seller must have "sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product." Mar-
ket dominance-some power to control price and to exclude
competition-is by no means the only test of whether the seller has
the requisite economic power. Even absent a showing of market
dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the
tying product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in it's
attributes.2 8
Although the Court found that there were competing substitutes for
the films, it held that sufficient market power had been shown because
the films were unique by virtue of their copyrights. Justice Goldberg,
writing for the Court, explained that if it is possible to find power from
either the unique attributes of a product of from its consumer appeal, it
would not then be necessary to examine the relevant market nor to
determine the seller's market share.29
The Court's decision in Loew's, particularly when considered in con-
junction with Northern Pacific, brodened the scope of the per se rule by
eliminating the necessity of establishing, on the basis of market data, any
preeminence in the tying market. It did not, however, delineate clearly
how the lower courts were to determine when a tying product had
achieved a sufficiently high level of uniqueness or distinction to merit
bringing the case within the purview of the per se doctrine of illegality.
Thus, although the Supreme Court's original concept of "market
power" has been broadened by its development of the per se doctrine
in the tying cases, it seems clear that there are still two prerequisites for
the application of the per se doctrine. First, economic power in the
tying product, whether established by "distinctiveness", market dom-
inance, or some other relevant test, must be shown; secondly, a not
insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied market must
be foreclosed by the agreement.
THE DECISION IN FORTNER ENTERPRISES, INC. V.
UNITED STATES STEEL CORP.
The situation presented in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
28. Id. at 45.
29. Id. at 45 n.4. See Day, supra note 23, at 546.
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Steel Corp.80 differs from that presented in International Salt and
Northern Pacific. In the latter two cases the lower court granted sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs. The District Court in Fortner, how-
ever, granted a motion for summary judgment for the defendant. It
held that no question of fact was raised as to a possible violation of the
antitrust laws, indicating that although a traditional tying arrangement
was involved, the two prerequisites for the per se illegality of tying
arrangements under the Sherman Act had not been established.
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that these prerequisites need
not necessarily be satisfied in order to prevail on the merits; the peti-
tioner can still prevail at trial if he can prove that the general standards
of the Sherman Act have been violated." Petitioner's complaint was
sufficiently broad to encompass such violations as it alleged that:
[R]espondents conspired together for the purpose of restrain-
ing competition and acquiring a monopoly in the market for prefab-
ricated houses.32
The Court indicated clearly that where such allegations are made
summary judgment can rarely be granted because motive and intent are
exceedingly important in antitrust litigation and proof is largely in the
hands of the conspirators.3 3
Justice Black, writing for the Court, indicated that the allegation of
the complaint not only raised the issues of possible violations of the gen-
eral provisions of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason,3 4 but, if
proved at trial, were sufficient to bring the defendant's conduct within
the purview of the per se doctrine of illegality which had been de-
veloped in the Court's previous tying arrangement cases.
The requirement of the per se doctrine that a not insubstantial amount
of interstate commerce in the tied market be forclosed was not met, in
the District Court's judgment, because the contract with Fortner Enter-
prises foreclosed only a small percentage of the land available for de-
velopment in the Louisville area. The Supreme Court disapproved of
this approach. The relevant figure of the volume of sales foreclosed is
not those foreclosed by the specific contract with petitioner, but the
total dollar volume of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge.3 5
30. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
31. Id. at 500.
32. Id.
33. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
34. Alleged violations of the Sherman Act which do not come within the limits of
an area which has been defined as a per se offense by the Supreme Court, are tested by
a "rule of reason" to determine if the practice involved affected an unreasonable re-
straint upon interstate trade, United States v. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
35. 394 U.S. at 502.
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The amount of the sales foreclosed under this standard from 1960-1962
was in excess of $9,000,000. Since in International Salt v. United
States,36 the amount foreclosed was $500,000, the Court concluded that
the foreclosure present in Fortner was certainly not insubstantial.
The District Court held that petitioner's allegations did not establish
that the United States Steel Homes Credit Corporation had a dominant
position in the credit market.
The Supreme Court, in reversing, reiterated the position it had enun-
ciated in Northern Pacific and Loew's, i.e. that dominance in the tying
market was not necessary for application of the per se doctrine and that
an appreciable restraint on competition in the tied product could result
even though the seller had a lesser amount of economic power.
In both instances, despite the freedom of some or many buyers
from the sellers power, other buyers-whether few or many,
whether scattered throughout the market or part of some group
within the market--can be forced to accept the higher price be-
cause of their stronger preferences for the product, and the seller
could therefore choose instead to force them to accept a tying
arrangement that would prevent free competition for their patron-
age in the market for the tied product. Accordingly, the proper
focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to raise
prices or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with
respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market.3T
Thus, Fortner seems to reinforce the proposition, originally implied
by the Court's language in Northern Pacific, that evidence of acceptance
of burdensome tying arrangements by a substantial number of buyers
is, in and of itself, sufficient evidence of power in the tying product to
invoke the per se doctrine.38  However, the Court clearly did not base
its decision that the requisite power existed in the tying product solely
upon Fortner's acceptance of the tie-in. To have done so would require
that the Court accept the fact that a single buyer's acceptance of a
tying arrangement was sufficient proof that the seller retained economic
power over the tying product. In interpreting Fortner on this point, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Advance Business Systems v. SCM
said:
Although the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, it recog-
36. 332 U.S. at 395.
37. 394 U.S. at 503-04.
38. Advance Business Systems and Supply Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62(4th Cir. 1969), the first court of appeals decision to interpret Fortner, discussed this
issue, saying: "For the same reason, a seller's successful imposition of a tying arrange-
ment on a substantial amount of commerce may be taken as proof of his economic
power over the tying product."
1970
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nized the validity of its reasoning that no inference could be drawn
from a single buyer's acceptance of the tie-in. The Court there-
fore rested its finding that the seller had sufficient power over the
tying product on a factual assessment of the product's "uniqueness"
and "desirability" rather than on mere success in imposing the tie-
in.39
Notwithstanding its discussion of this method of showing power in
the tying product, the Court in Fortner supported its finding that power
in the tying product did, indeed, exist by determining that it was unique
and distinctive.
The difficulty that is present in using a uniqueness test to determine
economic power in a fact situation such as Fortner presents, does not
exist when the tying product is patented, copyrighted, or a parcel of
land. However, the tying product in Fortner was credit and to find
credit "distinctive" requires a broadening of the use of the concept of
"distinctiveness". The Court did not define uniqueness in terms of the
product itself, but in terms of the availability of the product.
Uniqueness confers economic power only when other competitors
are in some way prevented from offering the distinctive product
themselves. Such barriers may be legal, as in the case of pat-
ented and copyrighted products, e.g. International Salt; Loew's,
or physical, as when the product is land, e.g., Northern Pacific. It
is true that the barriers may also be economic, as when competitors
are simply unable to produce the distinctive product profit-
ably . .. 40
The Court found that during the 1959-1962 period no other lending
institution was willing to match the 100% financing terms offered by the
United States Steel Homes Credit Corporation. In addition, Fortner
Enterprises, Inc., accepted the tying condition even though the tied
product-prefabricated houses, was priced $400 over competitive
houses. To the Court this suggested that the financing terms
were uniquely advantageous to the plaintiff, and this, in turn, indicated
the existence of the requisite power necessary to make the tie-in illegal.
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, drew a different conclusion
from the advantageous financing terms offered by the Credit Corpora-
tion.
A low price in the tying product-money, the most fungible
item of trade since it is by definition an economic counter-is es-
pecially poor proof of market power when untied credit is avail-
able elsewhere. In that case, the low price of credit is functionally
39. Id. at 67.
40. 394 U.S. at 505 n.2.
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equivalent to a reduction in the price of the houses sold.41
Justice White maintained that, in such a case, cutting prices should not
be viewed as an attempt to acquire power in the tied market, but as an
attempt to compete in the tied market. He indicated further that, in
effect, the decision of the majority necessarily determines that the Sher-
man Act, with its policy of fostering competition, can also be used to ex-
clude competition. Justice White did not argue that where there is
independent proof of market power such an arrangement should be
banned, but without such proof he concluded that the evil of tying
arrangements-the acquisition of power in the tied market-is absent.42
Justice Black responded to this argument by suggesting that al-
though money is a fungible item, credit, which is granted under varied
and differing terms, is not. Thus, a large, efficient corporation could
certainly use power in the credit market to acquire power in the tied
product.
The element of the Fortner case which is potentially its most signifi-
cant aspect, is the impact the decision will have on large businesses
which sell goods on credit. Justice Fortas, writing a dissenting opinion
in which he was joined by Justice Stewart, focused on the problem:
Almost all modem selling involves providing some ancillary
services in connection with making the sale-delivery, installation,
fixturing, servicing, training of the customer's personnel in use of
the material sold, furnishing display material and sales aids, ex-
tension of credit. Customarily-indeed almost invariably-the
seller offers these ancillary services only in connection with the
sale of his own products, and they are often offered without cost or
at bargain rates.44
If the arrangement in Fortner is viewed as a tie, then a question is raised
as to the validity of all these arrangements. Justice Fortas, however,
viewed the transaction in Fortner as the sale of a single product with
only the incidental provision of financing. In support of this position,
he noted that most of the financing, $1,700,000, was for the cost of the
houses, not the cost of the land.4"
The majority disagreed that there was essentially only one product
involved. It distinguished the facts in Fortner from the usual sale on
credit in that in the latter arrangement a single individual or corporation
41. Id. at 515.
42. Id. at 519.
43. Id. at 509.
44. Id. at 525.
45. Id. at 522, 523.
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comes to an agreement as to when and how much he will be paid for
the product.
Sales such as that are a far cry from the arrangement involved
here, where the credit is provided by one corporation on condition
that a product be purchased from a separate corporation, and where
the borrower contracts to obtain a large sum of money over and
above that needed to pay the seller for the physical products pur-
chased. 46
Thus, although the Court in Fortner found that two products were
involved, and that the doctrines developed in the tying cases applied, it
limited its holding to the fact situation presented there. It is, therefore,
entirely possible that where credit is granted only to purchasers of the
lender's products, the transaction may not be viewed as a tying arrange-
ment particularly if no separate corporate credit subsidiary is involved,
or if the credit is issued solely for the purchase price of the products sold.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court by its decision in Fortner Enterprises v. United
States Steel has taken an additional step in developing the trend it
initiated in Northern Pacific towards eliminating the requirement of
producing an independent showing of market power in order to activate
the application of the per se doctrine of illegality in tying arrangement
cases. In doing so, it substituted a finding that because the tying
product was uniquely advantageous to the buyer, the requisite economic
power existed, at least on the basis of the allegations contained in the
plaintiffs complaint. This finding was supported by the inference of
economic power which the Court suggests may be drawn from the mere
acceptance of the terms of a burdensome tying arrangement by the
buyer.
In discussing the second requirement for the application of the per se
doctrine, foreclosure of a substantial amount of commerce, the Court
clearly indicated that this requirement was to be measured by the total
sales foreclosed by the defendant's sales policy, not just those involved in
its dealings with the plaintiff, or with others in the Louisville area.
Although the Court appears to have significantly facilitated applica-
tion of the per se doctrine, given the existence of a tying arrangement, it
has not dispensed completely with the necessity to show economic
power in the tying product, and foreclosure of a "substantial" amount
of commerce in the tied product.
46. Id. at 507.
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Possibly the most significant aspect of the Fortner decision, at least
in terms of its economic ramifications, is its holding that financing pro-
vided by a seller upon the condition that the buyer purchase the seller's
product, may be a tying arrangement, not, as Justice Fortas argued,
simply a sale of one product. It is submitted that the Court properly
limited this holding to the facts of the instant case, and that extension
of this concept to instances where the lender does nothing more than
finance a whole or part of the purchase price of an item would be in-
advisable.4 7
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47. Such an extension would have severe economic repercussions in view of the
large number of American firms that finance sales of their products, but refuse to ex-
tend credit to anyone not purchasing those products. In at least the large majority of
these cases, the financing can truly be said to be incidental to the sale, and perfectly
adaptable to Justice Fortas' "one product" theory previously mentioned.
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